What could it mean to be religious in a world where religion no longer retains its former authority? Posing this question for his fellow Western intellectuals who inhabit just such a world, James C. Edwards investigates the loss of religion's traditional power in a culture characterized by what he calls "normal nihilism"—a situation in which one's commitment to a particular set of values is all one really has, and in which traditional religion is only a means of interpretation used to (...) preserve what one most cares about. Recognizing the important historical role of religion in making us the people we are, he seeks to establish a viable understanding of religion without traditional beliefs and within the context of contemporary skepticism. _The Plain Sense of Things_ is a book more interested in the power of religion that in its truth and in what happens to that power when the claims to truth slacken their grip. (shrink)

To ask whether we should use Prozac or other technologies as “enhancement” is perhaps to ask the wrong question, one that belongs to a life of what Heidegger discerned as technological ordering (die Technik). We might better ask a question belonging to a life of receptivity (Gelassenheit): Can or should we—some of us—live differently than we do?

This chapter contains sections titled: I II III.

These twelve essays were published to honor Norman Malcolm on his seventy-second birthday. Malcolm, who taught at Cornell from 1948 to 1978, has been a notable presence in contemporary analytic philosophy, valued not only for his own strong voice but also because his work has extended the influence of his two great teachers at Cambridge, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The essays in this Festschrift canvass topics in the philosophy of mind and in epistemology; and, as one would expect (...) from admirers of Malcolm, they are written carefully, clearly, and with admirable attention to argument. If, however, Thomas Nagel is right to say that Malcolm's most significant influence on his students was a sense that "philosophical perplexity is our most important resource; that the greatest danger in philosophy is to lose the sense of what is really puzzling and so to become susceptible to answers that leave the real problems untouched", then several of these essays fall short of Malcolm's ideal. For all their lucidity and their workmanlike progress from point to point, they leave the reader with no great appreciation for the depth--what Wittgenstein called the Pathos--of philosophical problems. (shrink)